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life,"3 while Melanchthon, in his 1521 Loci, captured the reformational self-understanding in the pointed thesis that lets itself be heard as a clarion call: "libertas est christianismus [Christianity is freedom]."4 For many this call seems to harmonize well with the modern call to free‫-‬ dom, such as the one issued, for example, by the French Revolution ("Liberty!" together with "Equality!" and "Fraternity!"). According to Hegel, the political understanding of freedom in his own day was but an outcome of the religious understanding of freedom in the Reformation. In view of that, as the story goes,5 he w ould raise a glass twice a year in order to drink to freedom: on 31 October, and on 14 July, the day of the capturing of the Bastille. For Hegel, there exists no conflict between the reformational and modern understanding of freedom; there is rather complete harm ony. 6 In evaluating the relation between the modern and reformational understanding of freedom, much depends on how one defines the relation between continuity and discontinuity and on whether, in this task, one allows oneself to be guided by the perspective of historical impact or that of reception history. Subject to evaluation is a historical process that does not develop in a linear fashion, above all not as a historical impact whose causality is understood to be mechanical. From the standpoint of reception history this process develops rather as challenge and response (Toynbee), so that w hat is given does in its own way demand, and is taken as, a challenge that finds a specific response. For this reason, this process is not subject to the fate of causal and irreversible determination. Rather, to each response there belongs a moment of freedom. Otherwise critique and metacritique w ould remain impossible.
This freedom receives no recognition in Emanuel Hirsch's discussion of "destiny [Schicksal] ," a perspective that informs his judgment on the subject of the "transformation of Christian thought in modernity."7 For Hirsch, the destiny that awaits the Christian faith in modernity is inexorabie. "The gate to the Christian past has been slammed shut for all of us ever since this destiny has come upon us. Only in the mode of longing and self-deception can the person on whom the reflection of the past hundred years has done its work still have a relation to the old form of Christian faith and thought."8
It is correct to say that we do not choose the historical-social, political, cultural, and spiritual-situation in which we live. We cannot negate it in an abstract fashion and allow the reformational and modern understanding of freedom to break apart in a diastasis. The decisions made, for example, by Semler and Schleiermacher are events that have given rise to an epoch and work themselves out in a fate-like fashion insofar as no contemporary can escape them. Nevertheless, to each person belongs the freedom of-reasonable-opposition and metacritical reorientation. The decisions that define neo-Protestantism-the anthropological turn, above all9-are no stoicheia tou kosmou (Gal 4:3, 9; Col 2:20), no elemental powers before which everyone must bow, as Hirsch would have it. What is commanded, in place of submission, is a standpoint and a response, which, if necessary, may consist in opposition. No one has to practice theology "under" the conditions of modernity, but rather-for the innermost theological reason, that is, for the sake of the universal validity of the Gospelone can, as indicated, assume a critical stance toward them. Readiness for engagement makes the theologian stand in concrete opposition: as a contemporary in opposition, just like Johann Georg Hamann.
This said, I propose that freedom be taken as a "critical concept for conveying a principle [Vermittlungsbegriff] ."10 The concept of freedom, given its history as well as its semantic field, is suited like no other to produce a fruitful struggle for the truth of the Christian faith and life in relation to the respective historical context. If this truth should be compromised through indiscriminate adjustment to contemporary life, or to the same extent, through fundamental and abstract antagonism toward it, if it should in contrast to both these extremes be perceived as timely in that it does not quite fit the times, then the theology that serves it dare not shy away from controversies. As a theology that does not avoid controversy and a science that does not avoid conflict, it moves beyond wholesale adoption and wholesale rejection of the understanding of freedom offered by philosophy and the human sciences. It neither calms nor immunizes itself with a diastasis of reformational and modern understanding of freedom, nor does it assert a fundamental identity or the possibility of a smooth appropriation. Rather than denying controversy, as is done by the thesis of the necessary transformation, it attempts far more to articulate itself, by means of direct confrontation, within the controversy itself.11
If, in controversy-laden exchange, theology should use the concept of freedom in this way, as a critical concept for conveying a principle, then the concept as such does not necessitate a theory of convergence between the reformational and modern understandings of freedom.12 It makes it possible, rather, to deal with the difference between the intentions of the reformational and modern understandings of freedom. This difference corresponds to the manner in which faith remains foreign within thought. When so approached, the Reformation and modernity do not break apart with no relation whatsoever but, without eclipsing their mutual difference, remain related to each other. Now that the question is posed in this manner, it is certain to be so wide-ranging and multidimensional that it cannot be comprehensively addressed in the framework given here. What follows (3) can bring into view only some of the focal points of the conversation between the reformational and modern understanding of freedom, a conversation that, historically, has now gone on for centuries. First of all, however, we wish to focus on the heart of Luther's understanding of freedom in order to acquire the necessary orientation (2).
LUTHER'S UNDERSTANDING OF FREEDOM IN BRIEF
Luther's interest in human freedom, to be sure, has a universally anthropological character because it concerns what pertains to every human being. However, it is, as such, a thoroughgoingly soteriological interest: it is oriented toward salvation or perdition, toward life or death. The human being is regarded as a sinner-as a creature that, in misusing his original freedom, has always contradicted this freedom and has of his own accord 11. For a concrete implementation of this program, I can refer the reader to my book, Leib forfeited and lost it together with his image of God (Rom 3:23). The human faculty of the will is in this radical sense unfree, a servum arbitrium. The human being regains the forfeited freedom only through Jesus Christ, who again grants and imparts freedom to the person; it is a new, défini-tive freedom, that ‫״‬ Christ has gained for him and given to him."13 It is Christ-freedom. For this reason human freedom is concretely the freedom of a Christian. Where the faculty of the will at the root of one's existence is concerned, one who is not a Christian is unfree; such a person remains suspended, and entangles himself further in contradicting his destiny.
What reveals this contradiction to the person is God's demanding will: God's Law. It uncovers this contradiction; it uncovers sin. The Law convicts me of sin as a misuse of my original freedom and judges and condemns me.
Without reference to the accusing and judging Law, it is impossible to understand the freedom that Christ has newly brought, which has newly come through, with, and in him. Without such reference, this freedom is meaningless and pointless. In the Law, you hear The freedom of a Christian, the newly created freedom of a human being, the restitution of his corrupted and forfeited original freedom is, as Christ-freedom, freedom from the Law. This is its first characteristic. Christ has ended and abolished the Decalogue, including the Sermon on the Mount, which radicalizes it: "Christ is the end of the Law" (Rom 10:4). However, this abrogatio legis, this radical abrogation of the Law does not in any way imply that God's Law is no longer in force, for it is and remains "holy, just and good" (Rom 7:12). One ought to continue to do the works of the Law; for the Law no longer condemns me if I do not fulfill The condemnation of the Law thus no longer applies to me, because God himself took it upon himself in his Son, dealt with it in his self, removed us from it and into himself, into his holy fellowship. Consequently, the most important affirmation of Luther's doctrine of freedom centers on 2 Cor 5:21 and Gal 3:13. "For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God" (2 Cor 5:21). And Gal 3:13, "the key to the Pauline understanding of Jesus' death"17: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us-for it is written, 'Cursed be every one who hangs on a tree' [Deut 21:22f]" (Gal 3:13).
God himself has in his Son taken upon himself our unfreedom, or to put it better, our ruinous and lethally willful misuse of our original freedom, so that we might be ransomed, saved, and free. This ransom, this acquittal is something completely different, for example, from an idea of reason in Kant's sense. Freedom in a theological sense has nothing to do with an intelligible determination of the person but is rather constitutively tied up with that concrete historical event in which Jesus Christ on the cross "purchased" for us freedom. At the same time freedom is constitutively tied up with that concrete historical event in which Jesus Christ as the living Lord "distributes"18 it to us as the "external W ord"19 of the sacramental sermon: he promises, administers, and gives his very self in, with, and under the "external Word"; takes us up into himself, into the space of his being; and gives us a share in his priestly and royal freedom. In short, we have our freedom from the Law in Jesus Christ.
In this Christ-space of freedom that is created and sustained through the "external Word" (das leibliche Wort, verbum externum), there takes place the "happy exchange and struggle."20 This space is a concrete, physical space of history, bound up with the water of baptism and the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper-the substitutionary space where Jesus Christ, "true God, begotten of the Father in eternity, and also a true human being, born of the Virgin Mary,"21 takes away from me the Law's condemnation, pulls me out of this condemnation, and takes my sin upon himself, so that in its place he might give me his own righteousness, his life, his brightness, and the fullness of his grace. Liberation from condemnation through the Law is-we are now focusing on the third characteristic-as new freedom at the same timefreedom for the fulfillment of the Law, because Christ is not only the end of the Law but also its "fullness."22 The new freedom is freedom for the Law's fulfillment "in free love":23 freedom not only from but also for. It is a free‫-‬ dom marked by a new perception of the self, the world, and God. In this perception the fulfillment of the Law is no longer a soteriological burden; it is no longer a question of salvation or self-constitution. And I-no Ionger locked up in myself under the tyranny and compulsion of the Law, insofar as sin turns to the Law and makes use of it-am again brought into the unconstrained and the open. With heart, mouth, and hands, I am brought to an astonishing and active awareness of God. This awareness takes place in the return of the received gift to God through thanksgiving and praise, as well as in passing it on, in that in love, I "give myself as a Christ to my neighbor."241 let Christ first become a "sacramentum" or rather "donum/' to me, but then, on account of the freedom guaranteed to me through the "sacramentum/ ' I take him as exemplum.25
This new-threefold-freedom to which we are liberated through Christ is characterized by a self-forgetfulness, understood as a thoroughly relational and excentric constitution of the self. Luther gives a classic 25. The fundamental distinction between faith and love, which manifests itself in the twopart division of Luther's freedom treatise, is underscored w ith particular clarity in A Brief Instruction on What to Look for and Expect in the Gospels, the opening piece of the Wartburgpostille (1522). Luther writes: "The chief article and foundation of the gospel is that before you take Christ as an example, you accept and recognize him as a gift, as a present that God has given you and that is your own" (LW 35:119; WA 10l:l, 11,12-18), and therefore "that you do not make Christ into a Moses, as if Christ did nothing more than teach and provide examples as the other saints do, as if the gospel were simply a textbook of teachings or laws" (LW 35:119; WA 10l:l, 10,20-11,1). Christ as a gift creates faith, Christ as an example provides a model for works of love: "Christ as a gift nourishes your faith and makes you a Christian. But Christ as an example exercises your works. These do not make you a Christian. Actually they come forth from you because you have already been made a Christian. As w idely as a gift differs from an example, so w idely does faith differ from works, for faith possesses nothing of its own, only the deeds and life of Christ. Works have something of your ow n in them, yet they should not belong to you but to your neighbor" (LW 35:120; WA 101:!, 12,17-13,2). P r o E c c l e s i a V o l . XXII, No. 3 expression to this in the concluding thesis of his freedom tractate: "A Christian lives not in himself, but in Christ and in his neighbor: in Christ through faith, in the neighbor through love."26 "See, this is the true, spiritual, Christian freedom, which makes the heart free from all sins, laws and commandments; it excels all other freedoms just as heaven does the earth."27 Luther can thus distinguish between "other freedoms"-"all other liberty, which is external"28-and specifically Christian freedom. He distinguishes the spiritual (Christ‫)-‬ freedom (which, to be sure, is imparted through the "external Word," and thus in a worldly fashion) from worldly freedom, which belongs in the realm of iustitia civilis. We must come back to this point, but we must first attend to the significance that Luther ascribes to the conscience in connection with his understanding of freedom. powerfully into the collective cultural consciousness. It often serves to legitimate the neo-Protestant postulate of the immediacy of God for an individual believer who, in his conscience, "is alone with himself and God, who stands over against him."31 If we fail to take notice that such appeals to this very scene make the relation to God abstract, indeterminate, and lacking in externality, then it is quite legitimate to speak of one's obligation only to one's own, individual conscience, which does not let itself be questioned in regard to concrete decisions and, correspondingly, can hardly provide an argumentative explanation of itself. However, at Worms Luther by no means appeals to a conscience that is unconstrained-free-floating, as it were-or related only to itself, responsible only to itself, and in the end beyond having to give an account of itself. Rather, the verdict of his conscience is determined authoritatively through Scripture and tradition. For Luther's confession at Worms literally goes as follows: "capta conscientia in verbis dei," "[my] conscience is captive to the Word of God,"32 it is determined by the Law and the Gospel. Luther orients himself to the following hierarchy of authorities:33 1. Holy Scripture 2. the confessions of the Church 3. the decisions of the Councils 4. the voices of the Church Fathers 5. the rational character of the approach to Scripture; here he lets himself be persuaded only by "rationes evidentes."
What completely belies the claim that makes Luther a proponent of a freedom given with the immediacy of God for an individual believer is Luther's understanding of the "external Word" and of the presence of Christ in the pastoral office.34 Briefly to speak to Luther's understanding of the sacramental Word, he vigorously upheld the "ex opere operato," the objective validity of the performed sacrament in the sense of "ex verbo P r o E c c l e s i a V o l . XXII, No. 3 dicto,‫״‬ as had been the case before him.35 By no means does Luther advocate a pure interiority or immediacy of God. For him the question is not whether human, creaturely, and institutional mediation is in general necessary, but how and where it happens. He insists that God does not wish to speak to humans or to impart himself to them-thus creating faith-without the creaturely water of Baptism, or without the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper, fruit of the earth and of human work. We shall have to clarify later how precarious it is for the constitution of faith when the modern Narcissus takes possession of himself; we shall then have to correct the neo-Protestant praise of pure interiority through "praise of exteriority."36
Limiting the Authority of the Temporal Government for the Sake of Freedom of Conscience
According to Luther's understanding, the freedom of conscience, which is identical with faith, comes from the physical, oral, external, and in this sense ‫״‬ public" Word of Christ, accompanied by the Holy Spirit, who freely works through this Word. Insofar as this is where freedom of conscience originates, faith can hardly be established though governmental, and in this sense "public," coercion. It rests, after all, on the free-Spiritwrought-assent of the heart. No one can compel anyone to faith. In the second part of his treatise on temporal authority, Luther writes: "How he believes or disbelieves is a matter for the conscience of each individual, and since this takes nothing away from the temporal authority the latter should be content to attend to its own affairs and let men believe this or that as they are able and willing, and constrain no one by force. For faith is a free act, to which no one can be forced."37
Faith is, therefore, no longer a private thing, which is what, for understandable reasons, it became in modernity.38 Because faith comes from the external Word, the public sphere established by the government must give space to this Word, and together with it to faith, and must protect it. If the government, as totalitarian governments do, encroaches on this Word-and faith-wrought sphere, on God's "spiritual" authority, it must meet with (passive) resistance. The competence and powers of the gov- ernment are clearly delimited; hence it must be asked "to what extent" one owes it obedience. In this way Luther's brilliant distinction between God's "spiritual" and "temporal" authority (Regiment) functions as an antidote for the later absolutism, as well as for totalitarian systems of the twentieth century; it became one of the roots of modernity's basic right of the freedom of religion and conscience.39 That in our present social and political situation this freedom may also be determined differently than through the Word of Christ and faith in him raises a question that lies beyond Luther's own horizon. In our own time we have to handle this question in the category of a religious right, as a human right to freedom of religion, without thereby being able directly to appeal to Luther-without having thereby to appeal to him directly. Likewise, the modern distinction between religion and politics, as well as between morality and law, a cultural achievement that is hard to overestimate, is unthinkable without Luther's distinction between God's spiritual and temporal authority. It is unthinkable without, on the one hand, the limitation of governmental power for the sake of the freedom of faith, and on the other, the limitation of ecclesiastical-clerical claims to power and publicness for the sake of a rational secularity that underlies the actions of the civil society and government. This heritage receives a clear emphasis in the fifth thesis of the Barmen Declaration (1934).40
Free Will. External Freedom within the Limits of iustitia civilis alone
As things stand, we encounter the same distinction, as we now pursue the allusion at the end of Luther's freedom treatise and differentiate between "spiritual" freedom and "other freedoms," "libertates externóles." What Luther has in mind is the freedom of choice, decision, and action in the province of iustitia civilis. The Augsburg Confession devotes a separate article to it, Article XVIII, "Of the Free Will": "Concerning free will it is taught that a human being has some measure of free will, so as to live an externally honorable life and to choose among the things reason P r o E c c l e s i a V o l . XXII, No. 3 comprehends"41-among "things subject to reason."42 The province of iustitia civilis embraces marriage, family, economy, the upbringing and education of children, law, and temporal government. 43 In this province of iustitia civilis, Luther's regard for freedom of choice, decision, and action, given together with reason, cannot be high enough. As "the inventor and mentor of all the arts, medicines, laws, and of whatever wisdom, power, virtue, and glory men possess in this life,"44 reason is a "divinum quiddam," "something downright divine," as Luther points out in The Disputation Concerning Man (1536).45 It is not destroyed or lost through the misuse of the original freedom, through sin-unlike the image of God in the sense of one's relation to God. Instead, God himself "after the fall of Adam" did not "take away the majesty of reason," its "maiestas," its dominion mandate (Gen 1:28), and together with it the freedom of choice, decision, and action, "but rather confirmed it," affirmed it ("sed potius confirmavit").46 Reason and freedom are within the limits of iustitia civilis alone,47 because reason is conscious of its limits as well as its capacity for achievement; and not least is it conscious of the danger it poses for itself. It is relieved of absolutisms and thus liberated for a sober-minded view of possibilities and necessities that lie within the world and within history. It is free to endure contradictions and differences and, relieved of existential worry, to deal with them in vocational care for law and peace, "as if there were no God," as Luther writes provocatively in his exposition of Psalm 127 for the Christians in Riga. 48 However, this self-denial is possible within the limits of iustitia civilis alone only if the use of worldly freedom is critical, that is, when it is able to distinguish its liberum arbitrium from servum arbitrium, its libertas externa of works from the libertas interna of faith. If this distinction, or its functional equivalent, such as the Delphic "Know yourself!" (as a mortal faced with the immortal),49 disappears from view, then worldly reason loses its worldliness and overburdens itself with promises of luck and salvation. It becomes a substitute for religion that, to put it philosophically, has its source in a "confusion of the world and God, the contingent and the absolute."50 In modernity this happens where a scientific, naturalistic, and, above all, economic single-dimensionality wishes to reign supreme.
Thus our conflict-conscious dialogue must consider critically not only transformations, where, as the following section (3.4) will show, the demonstration of the limits of human freedom at least preserves traces of Luther's distinctions. We must rather direct our attention polemically to powers that-in their assertion of a scientific, naturalistic, and above all economic single-dimensionality of reality-may be characterized as having failed to recognize and having forgotten the difference between inner and outer freedom and together with it the difference between Creator and creature.51 3.4 The Modern Narcissus, or the Displacement of the Relation to God into the Reflexivity of Self-Relation
The anthropological turn, underway since the middle of the eighteenth century, spurred a reconstruction of the reformational understanding of freedom. This reconstruction, undertaken from the perspective of subjectivity theory, has become increasingly expansive in contemporary systematic theology. To be sure, it does not lose sight of the difference between Creator and creature. This difference appears in the demonstration of the limits of human freedom, which, as self-determination, must already assume and act on the fact that it does not determine itself for self-determination but rather is determined for it.52 As a human being, one has not, in one's finite freedom, decreed oneself, has not made oneself, but instead discovers oneself in freedom: as given to oneself-just as, according to Kant, the Law, which demands, postulates, and comprehends freedom, is simply given, a "fact" of pure reason.53 Once we disregard that, in this reconstruction of the reformational understanding of freedom, the question about the concrete mode of being given fades away, that "God" is cloaked in a completely formal passivum divinum, and that his external creative Word is for this reason reduced to the hieroglyphic assertion that I am determined for self-determination-but then also "condemned"54 to it-if we disregard this, then we must, when faced with the titanism of a Fichte, Marx, or Sartre,55 acknowledge and admire Schleiermacher's demonstration of the limits of human freedom and his insistence on "the feeling of absolute dependence" as the basic human disposition. One must see in it the historical achievement, in philosophical and theological terms, of a contemporary who chose to differ.
Schleiermacher certainly paid a tribute to his age and its anthropological turn in that he considered "God," as the Whence of the feeling of absolute dependence, to be already "implied [mitgesetzt]" in this feeling,56 "enclosed" in it.57 Drastic and cruel is Franz Overbeck's remark that such theology presumes "to have God daily in the pocket with it."58 If the consciousness of God is always already included in the self-consciousness, we say sharply and polemically: if it is so locked up in it, then one can only speak of God's immanence. Schleiermacher can no longer say that God addresses me and in this way approaches me. Because God is implied in my direct religious self-consciousness, is already there, he cannot come to me.59
Theology is always anthropology. Thus the anthropological turn of modernity was not the first to discover subjectivity and individuality. Hegel's "infinitely important determination that, for a content to be accepted and held to be true, man must himself be actively involved with 54. That w e are "condemned to be free" (Jean-Paul Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme [1946], 37: "l'homme est condamné à être libre") is likewise a passivum divinum. This shows how precarious the formal character of the talk of "determination to self-determination" is. "Determination to self-determination" cannot, as is apparent in Sartre, eliminate the placement of an infinite weight on finite human freedom, with the result that the essence of a human being proceeds from his existence ("l'existence précède l'essence," 21), and humans are exactly that which they make of themselves: "l'homme n'est rien d'autre que ce qu'il se fait" (22 it"60 has been the case at least since the Psalms, such as Ps 51, have been used in prayer. And Luther, in the tradition not least of such Psalms, emphasized like none other the individuality of the human being. What is at stake, therefore, in the critical determination of the relation between the Reformation and modernity, is not the question whether but how theology is anthropology. Given that, in consequence of the anthropological turn, since the mid-eighteenth century ‫״‬ the relation to God" has been "increasingly displaced into the reflexivity of the self-relation,"61 are we to accept this fact as a necessary transformation of the reformational understanding of the Word and of faith and thereby as an irreversible and inexorable destiny, as it not rarely happens in contemporary systematic theology?62 Or must we oppose this transformation and assert over against it the externality of the freedom-creating Word and the excentricity of faith, and hence its qualified self-forgetfulness, which does not render it "transparent to itself"?63 In my theological judgment, this is a rhetorical question. For a Lutheran theologian, the answer can also today be a decisive yes and will express itself in a "praise of exteriority."64 What must be opposed is the modern Narcissus:65 his incurvatio in seipsum, his being turned in on himself, his self-reflexivity-all that characterizes modern subjectivity's normative forms in their tendency to take into oneself its precepts or to discover them as already present within oneself, perhaps in the feeling of absolute dependence.
Law and Gospel in Modernity: The Problem of Secularized Freedom
The problem of transforming the reformational understanding of freedom into a modern one shows itself to be particularly illuminating when one considers it from the standpoint of the reformational distinction between the Law and the Gospel and, in doing so, makes use of this distinction not as something to be interpreted but as that which interprets. This should take place in the elucidation of the following thesis: Though, in its 
generalization of the Gospel, modernity is antinomian, it becomes at the same time increasingly legalistic.
Already in its designation, through which it summarizes its selfunderstanding, modernity professes itself to be gospel-oriented. It conceptualizes itself as an unquestionably new time that stands under the banner of freedom. The concrete Christological determination of the gospel is quietly-in a backhanded way, as it were-generalized,66 but in such enthusiastic generalization the gospel becomes abstract. The Christological ‫״‬ It is finished!" morphs into an already accomplished liberation to freedom, which is accorded to the human being by nature; all humans are by nature "emancipated," "mature" (Kant: "naturaliter maiorennes"). 67 Here the vanquishing of the Law is assumed fundamentally to have already taken place: humans are free, good, and spontaneous. In this sense modernity is antinomian.
However, what the new modern humanity already is, humans must also always first become; "humanity must make itself what it is."68 The universally affirmed gospel of freedom places humans at the same time under the compulsion to deliver on and to make a reality of that which is innately their very own.69 However, if freedom is not attributed and imparted, but from the outset is proper unto myself, and I am not really determined for it, but rather determine myself for it, then I am, both as individual and collective subjectivity, burdened with the fulfillment of that of which I am assured-not liberated for freedom, but "condemned to it."701 am not allowed to be free but must free myself. So the reverse side of antinomianism is a legalism.
CONCLUDING REMARK
As we can see, the central question is: Which freedom? The freedom of a Christian does not let itself be surreptitiously generalized. It concerns every hum an being, insofar as all humans are guilty of forfeiting their original freedom and depend on the newly created freedom that Christ has purchased for them and bestows upon them. But this freedom, available to each individual, is not a universal freedom that could be brought to mind or found in reference to oneself and one's own self-assurance. It comes instead as concrete faith through the concrete external Word. Nonetheless, the task of theology and proclamation is to relate this external Word to its transformations, formalizations, generalizations-not least in the form of that secularized freedom in which one must see the post-Christian version of the relation of the Law and the Gospel.
